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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with two examples of macro-regions in the EU: the Benelux and the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS). Building on the distinction between “old” and “new” regionalism, it discusses some 
characteristics of regions in general, and of sub-integration schemes within the EU in particular. These 
characteristics are applied to the two regions at hand. From this application it follows that the CBSS can be 
regarded as a “new” region, whereas the Benelux is an “old” region with some elements from new regionalism. 
The paper subsequently discusses some explanations for the emergence of macro-regions in the EU as well as 
the implications of this phenomenon for research on European integration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As argued elsewhere (Groenendijk 2007, 2011), contrary to common belief, EU member 
states have always and substantially been involved in alternative integration schemes, outside 
the EU, as well as in differentiated integration, within the EU. The classic community method 
of uniform integration throughout the EU is increasingly becoming a myth, as –within the 
enlarged EU- member states get more and more engaged in flexible integration schemes 
which do not involve all 27 member states and/or involve nation states from outside the EU. 
This paper deals with the implications of this development for the EU as such as well as for 
European integration theory. It focuses on two cases of regional integration (or: macro-
regions) within the EU: the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Benelux. While 
the Benelux is the oldest of the two (dating from 1948 and thus preceding the European 
Communities), the CBSS is larger and involves non-EU partners. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, when comparing macro-regions in the EU, it is 
important to have some models or archetypes at hand. In section 2 two types of models are 
discussed. First, we use some insights from the literature on regionalism, especially the 
distinction that has been made between “old” and “new” regionalism. Secondly, we will use 
some literature on differentiated integration within the EU. Consequently, in section 3, we 
will apply these frameworks to the two EU macro-regions at hand (Benelux and CBSS). In 
section 4 some implications of the existence and increasing importance of macro-regions in 
the EU for European integration theory will be dealt with. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Regionalism(s) and differentiated integration 
 
The Benelux is a relatively old region (as a customs union dating from 1948, but established 
during the second World War). It has been a macro-region within the EU ever since the 
European Communities started. The CBSS is relatively young (officially founded in 1992). In 
all likelihood this difference in genesis will have an impact on the characteristics of the 
Benelux and CBSS. Wallis (2000/2009) has contrasted “old” regionalism (which according to 
him has been the dominant school of thought of practice in regionalisation from the 1880s to 
the 1980s) and “new” regionalism by looking at six characteristics. In table 1 these 
characteristics are listed and briefly discussed (following but different from Wallis, 
2000/2009 and Williams, 2005). 
 
Table 1: Old versus new regionalism 
“Old” regionalism “New” regionalism 
Government: top-down establishment of new layers 
in the hierarchy of governments, with nation states as 
main actors 
Governance: bottom-up, goals-oriented, networks-
based, with involvement and shared responsibility of 
various public and private actors 
Structure-oriented: focus on formation of new 
regional structures (public entities), procedures as the 
pathway through these structures 
Process-oriented: process is central to creating 
vision, resolving conflict and building consensus. 
Closedness: focus on defining boundaries and 
jurisdictions. Delimitation and membership are 
crucial to the definition of the region 
Openness: boundaries are open, fuzzy or elastic. The 
region is defined by the issues at hand 
Coordination: hierarchical redistribution of resources 
through governments 
Collaboration/cooperation: voluntary agreements 
among equals 
Accountability & responsibility: fixed 
responsibilities and little flexibility 
Trust: as a binding element among regional interests. 
Responsibilities are flexibly shared 
Concentration of power: sovereignty of the state Diffusion of power, aimed at empowerment of actors 
 
As Wallis does, it is important to stress that the new regionalism is not necessarily superior to 
old regionalism. The old regionalism continues to offer important solutions to significant 
problems. Rather, the new regionalism is most centrally a response to a new set of problems 
that the old regionalism was either not aware of, or was not designed to address. 
Although Wallis’ typology is primarily meant for application to regions within (federal or 
unitary) states, the typology of “old” versus “new” regions can be applied to the EU as a 
whole (i.e. as a region on a global scale). It is clear that the EU itself is a product of “old” 
regionalism. 
 
When discussing macro-regions in the EU and more generally the issue of flexible 
integration, we also have to consider the relation between the larger integration on the one 
hand and the macro-regional integration on the other hand. The yardstick here is uniform 
integration (or: monolithic integration) as the default mode of EU integration: integration that 
is uniform in time and matter for all members of the integration scheme. According to 
Groenendijk (2007, 2011), partly based on Su (2005), sub-integration refers to an instance of 
integration that takes place among some but not all members of an already existing (larger) 
integration, and it can take different shapes. The first distinctive feature is whether sub-
integration takes place within the EU institutional framework or not. The second feature refers 
to the policies that are involved. Sub-integration can deal with policies that are within or 
outside of the EU policy domain (as marked out by the relevant EU Treaties). If sub-
integration uses another institutional framework than the EU framework it can either be 
labelled new integration or alternative integration. New integration refers to sub-integration 
outside the EU institutional framework dealing with policy areas that are not part of the EU 
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policy domain. Sub-integration outside the EU institutional framework, concerned with policy 
areas that are within the EU domain, is called alternative integration. In both cases it is 
possible to cooperate either among EU Member States only or with outsiders as well (third 
countries).  
If sub-integration occurs within the EU institutional framework, there are again two 
possibilities. One may call odd integration sub-integration that employs EU institutions but 
deals with policies outside the EU domain. The term differentiated integration is used to 
denote sub-integration taking place both within the institutional framework and within the 
policy domain of the EU. Formally such differentiated integration is made possible within the 
EU through the mechanism of enhanced cooperation. Differentiated integration has been 
discussed in the literature under a large number of different terms (core Europe, vanguard 
groups, multi-speed Europe, afgestufte Integration, concentric circles, variable geometry et 
cetera; see for a detailed discussion of these concepts Groenendijk 2007, 2011). Table 2 lists 
the various forms of sub-integration. 
 
Table 2: Types of sub-integration 
Differentiated integration Within the EU framework, dealing with policies within the EU domain 
Odd integration Within the EU framework, dealing with  policies outside of the EU domain 
Alternative integration Outside the EU framework, dealing with policies within the EU domain 
New integration Outside the EU framework, dealing with policies outside of the EU domain 
 
 
3. Macro-regions within the EU: Benelux and CBSS 
 
3.1 A brief overview of the Benelux Union 
 
Origins 
The so-called Low Countries are the historical lands around the low-lying delta of the Rhine, 
Scheldt, and Meuse rivers, and include the modern countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and parts of northern France and western Germany. The term originates from the 
Late Middle Ages. For centuries, the Low Countries have been united, separated and re-
united. As from 1430 the Low Countries were under the rule of the Dukes of Burgundy, 
followed by Habsburg rule. In 1512 Charles V established the so-called Burgundian Circle as 
one of the imperial circles of the Holy Roman Empire. In 1549 (after the Diet of Augsburg of 
1548) he declared the 17 provinces of the Circle inseparable. Nevertheless, 30 years later, in 
1579, separation did take place, as the seven protestant northern provinces, during the Eighty 
Years’ War, formed the Union of Utrecht, with the ten catholic southern provinces remaining 
under Spanish rule. This situation, which lasted for more than two centuries (i.e. the Republic 
of the United Netherlands, later called the Batavian Republic), ended with the accession, in 
1806, of Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon’s brother) to the throne of the newly established 
“puppet” Kingdom of Holland, placing all the Low Countries under French rule. After 
Napoleon was driven out of the Low Countries in 1813 (followed by his defeat at Waterloo in 
1815), William VI of Orange (aka William I of the Netherlands) became king of the Dutch 
and Belgian Netherlands (the latter having been under Spanish, Austrian and French rule 
consecutively) and became grand duke of Luxembourg. This reunification lasted for only 15 
years as Belgium separated itself from the Kingdom in 1830, with Luxembourg temporarily 
being brought under Belgian rule, until it also became fully independent in 1839. 
In the second part of the 19
th
 century and the first decades of the 20
th
 century the three 
independent nation states flourished economically, through increased trade, the development 
of a strong agricultural sector and the establishment of new manufacturing industries. 
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Relations between the states normalized rapidly. In 1846 a treaty on trade was conducted 
between the three states. After Luxembourg, for political reasons, retreated from the German 
Zollverein (in 1919), a treaty was conducted in 1921 which laid the foundations for an 
economic union, i.e. a common Benelux market. Economic decline in the interbellum led to a 
initial delay in the implementation of these plans, but the 1932 Treat of Ouchy provided for a 
decrease in import duties and abolished protectionist measures. A number of treaties 
conducted in 1943 and 1944 led to the birth of the Benelux customs union, on January 1, 
1948, which eventually was to progress into a full-fledged internal market. On November 1, 
1960, the –consolidated- Treaty on Benelux Economic Union (BEU, conducted in 1958) came 
into force, effectively creating such a common market. In June 2008 the Treaty was renewed. 
 
Policy domains 
The main policy area that the Benelux has been involved in is market integration (including 
integration in the field of intellectual property rights). This is still the core of the Benelux 
activities, even though these activities have largely been become part of the mainstream 
common market policies of the EU. In addition the Benelux has been involved in specific 
issues of cross-border cooperation. 
Recently, with the renewal of the Benelux treaty, the Benelux has identified a couple of new 
policy areas it has or will be engaged in: innovation, sustainable development and justice & 
home affairs. 
 
Institutional set-up 
The Benelux is an intergovernmental organization. Decisions are taken unanimously. They 
only become legally valid after they have been incorporated into national legislation. 
The Committee of Ministers is the main decision-making body of the Benelux and is made up 
of the ministers of the three countries. The Committee has a different composition depending 
on the issues at hand, and has a rotating presidency. In EU terms the Committee is the Council 
of Ministers. The Benelux Council consist of high-level civil servants of the three member 
states. It is in charge of preparation of Committee decisions (in EU terms: Coreper). The 
Secretariat-General is in charge of implementation of decisions and resembles the EU 
Commission. The Benelux parliament is not chosen directly, but is made up of national 
parliamentarians. In that  sense it resembles the “old” European Parliament, before EP became 
a directly elected body in 1977. As with the EU the Benelux also has a court, similar inset-up 
to the EU Court of Justice. 
 
Competencies & budget 
The legal instruments of the Benelux again are very similar tot the EU: regulations, directives 
and recommendations can be issued by the Committee of Ministers. 
The Benelux budget is set for a period of five years. This multi-annual budget is funded by 
the member states based on their national income. Within this multi-annual framework the 
Committee of Ministers sets annual budgets. 
 
 
3.2 A brief overview of the the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 
 
Origins 
As with the Low Countries, the countries of the Baltic Sea rim, have a complicated history of 
political unions, separations and conflicts. Roughly, according to Tassinari (2004), the Baltic 
Sea region comprises the German Länder of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Mecklenburg-
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Vorpommern, Northern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Leningrad and Kaliningrad 
oblasti (regions) and the St. Petersburg Municipality, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. 
The CBSS was officially founded in 1992, but as Tassinari (2004) and Williams (2005) argue, 
the region-building period started already in 1988, as the initial ideas of region-building in the 
Baltic Sea region arose parallel to the main changes that took place in the late 1980s in 
Europe in general and the specific geopolitical changes in the Baltic states. During this period 
of region-building references were made to various earlier regional cooperation schemes in 
this area, including the Hansa cooperation which stretched from the 14
th
 to the 16
th
 century. 
Policy domains 
The CBSS deals with five policy domains/priorities: environment/sustainable development, 
economic development, energy, education and culture, civil security and the human 
dimension. 
 
Institutional set-up 
The CBSS is an overall political forum for regional inter-governmental cooperation. The 
Members of the Council are the eleven states of the Baltic Sea Region (Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden) as well as 
the European Commission. The Council consists of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs from 
each Member State and a member of the European Commission. The Presidency of the 
Council rotates among the Member States on an annual basis. The role of the Council is to 
serve as a forum for guidance and overall coordination among the participating states. The 
foreign minister of the presiding country is responsible for coordinating the Council’s 
activities and is assisted in this work by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The 
Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) consists of high ranking representatives of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Member States as well as of the European Commission. 
The CSO serves as the main discussion forum and decision-making body for matters related 
to the work of the Council between Ministerial Sessions. The CSO monitors, facilitates and 
aims to coordinate the work of all CBSS structures. The CSO and its Expert Groups are 
serviced by the Permanent International Secretariat of the CBSS, which was established in 
1998. The mandate of the Secretariat is to provide technical and organisational support to the 
Chairman of the CBSS and the structures and working bodies of the Council; to ensure 
continuity and enhanced coordination of CBSS activities; to implement the CBSS Information 
and Communication Strategy; to maintain the CBSS archives and information database; to 
maintain contacts with other organisations operating in and around the Baltic Sea region, the 
national authorities of Member States and the media. 
 
Competencies & budget 
As the CBSS focuses on specific cooperation projects, it does not require specific legislative 
competencies. It does not have a general budget or project fund. Members are responsible for 
funding common activities and/or for seeking and coordinating financing from other sources. 
Since 1998, the CBSS Member States have financed jointly the Permanent International 
Secretariat of the CBSS. 
 
 
3.3 Benelux and CBSS: application of the analytical framework 
 
When applying the characteristics of old and new regionalism, it is clear that the Benelux is 
very much an “old” region whereas the CBSS is a “new” one. 
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The Benelux is an intergovernmental organization in which the nation states dominate. 
Although private actors may be involved in specific policy areas, the Benelux is governmental 
in nature. It is perfectly embedded, like a Russian doll, in the layer structure of the EU and its 
member states. The Benelux is also clearly oriented towards structures, given the close 
attention that is paid to the institutional set-up (which served as a role model for and is very 
much similar to the set-up of the European communities). The Benelux is also a closed entity 
with a clear geographical delimitation of membership. It uses hierarchical coordination, 
through its own legislative order (once again: perfectly embedded in the EU and national 
orders) to promote its main objective of a common market. Responsibilities and 
accountability are well-defined and linked up to its institutional structure (which includes a 
parliament and a conflict-settling court). It has a general budget and power is clearly 
concentrated with the Committee of Ministers in which the nation states rule (unanimously). 
However, recently, as part of its re-focus within the framework of the treaty renewal (a 
rebirth, according to some), the Benelux has incorporated some features of a “new” region. It 
has recently is engaged in cooperation with the German Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen (see 
Andringa, 2010, for a detailed discussion). It has moved away from its single focus on market 
integration through harmonization of legislation and is more oriented towards cooperation 
through projects in the policy fields it has newly embraced. Within its member states the 
institutional set-up (especially the role of the Benelux parliament) is increasingly discussed. 
 
By contrast the CBSS is about governance rather than governments. The CBSS has developed 
bottom-up and it heavily involves private actors and non-state actors as the European 
Commission. It is process and result oriented. Its boundaries are fuzzy and membership is 
open, as the inclusion of Norway and Iceland, as well as the large group of observer states, 
show. Mutual cooperation through projects is central to the activities of the CBSS, with the 
institutional set-up (responsibilities, division of tasks) varying greatly across these projects 
and policy areas. Power is diffused. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the CBSS is a result of a political process in which 
ideas from “old” regionalism did play a part. As Williams (2005) shows, the initial ideas of 
Schleswig-Holstein’s prime minister Engholm for a truly non-governmental Baltic Sea Forum 
or New Hanse, supported by Sweden’s minister (and later ambassador to Germany) 
Hellström, were slightly weakened by interventions from the German foreign Minister 
Genscher and his Danish counterpart Elleman-Jensen, who insisted on a significant role for 
the nation states in the CBSS. 
 
Turning to the second part of our analytical framework, the Benelux cooperation seems to be 
a mix of alternative and differentiated integration. On the one hand, it is dealing with issues 
that are clearly within the EU policy domain, but through a separate institutional framework. 
On the other hand, one could argue that, because of the similarities in institutional structure 
between the EU and the Benelux, the Benelux is an example of differentiated integration 
within the larger EU framework, as it is perfectly imbedded in the larger structure. 
The CBSS is harder to pin down in terms of type of integration. It has elements of new 
integration, alternative integration and differentiated integration combined. Still, basically the 
CBSS is an alternation scheme. Even though most of its member states are member states of 
the EU, the CBSS itself is not fully part of the EU institutional framework (as the “member” 
role of the European Commission clearly shows). Furthermore, it deals with policy issues that 
are also –partly- covered by the EU. 
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4. Regionalism, flexible integration and EU integration theory 
 
Within the EU we have witnessed the relatively recent emergence of several other macro-
regions (as exponents of alternative and/or differentiated integration), not just the CBSS. 
Similar constructs can be seen in the Danube Region, the North Sea-English Channel region, 
the Visegrad cooperation, the Black Sea cooperation and the Union for the Mediterranean, to 
just name a few cooperation schemes (which admittedly vary considerably in nature). From a 
different perspective, we can also witness the emergence of the use of the formal EU 
differentiated integration mechanism, enhanced cooperation, in the field of divorce law and in 
the field of patents. These cooperation schemes are probably just the proverbial tip of the 
iceberg, as enhanced cooperation schemes are now discussed in several other policy fields as 
well. 
The question to which we now turn, is how we can explain the emergence and existence of 
macro-regions and differentiated integration within the EU. Standard EU integration theory 
has three types of arguments available: functionalist arguments, liberal-intergovernmentalist 
arguments and constructivist arguments. 
 
As far as the Benelux is concerned, its emergence, in the 1940s, can be explained by a mix of 
all these arguments (as can the emergence of the European Communities). The Benelux was 
constructed (by the governments of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, in exile in 
London during the second Wold War) as a common project, with the three nation states 
conclusively at the helm, to reap economic benefits from free trade. Its continued existence 
(even through periods in which voices were raised to abolish the Benelux) can however 
hardly be explained by constructivist arguments. There is no clear Benelux identity (and one 
can nowadays even doubt the existence of a common identity in one of is member states, 
Belgium). Functional spillovers however have played a part (as in the wider field of European 
integration) in deepening the Benelux common market and in its recent involvement in 
sustainable development and justice & home affairs. Finally, the role of the Benelux states in 
the intergovernmental bargaining scheme, especially within the enlarged EU-27, in terms of 
increased relative bargaining power through cooperation, has presumably played an important 
part in the continued existence of the Benelux. 
 
As Tassinari (2004) shows the emergence of the CBSS can readily be understood from a 
constructivist perspective. Liberal-intergovernmentalist arguments referring to in-EU 
bargaining power presumably are not that important to the CBSS, but, as Williams (2005) 
shows, the CBSS has been important to regions within CBSS member states, especially to the 
German Länder involved, in the German federal power play, in which the Northern Länder 
have to compete with the southern Länder, especially Bayern. Given the policy issues the 
CBSS addresses and its composition (involving non-EU partners) functional arguments are 
probably important as well for explaining its emergence and role. 
 
Still, these standard explanations for regional cooperation are far from satisfying as they do 
not deal with the fact that these macro-regions are not stand-alone entities but are somehow 
alternative to the larger European integration scheme. The explanation thus –at least partly- 
has to be found in deficiencies of that larger scheme. As Fratianni (2003) and Su (2005) have 
argued the need for flexibility has arisen due to the enlargement of the EU. In the 1990s and 
the early 2000s the EU has pursued a double-track policy with two objectives, enlargement 
and deepening, which have increasingly have become in conflict with each other. Given large 
and heterogeneous membership, deep integration in certain policy fields and/or geographic 
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areas is attractive (in terms of costs and benefits) only to a limited number of member states. 
This argument does not necessarily hold for the core of European integration, the common 
market, but it is highly relevant to all other policy fields, including monetary union. By 
necessity and by nature, flexible integration follows an ad hoc approach, which is process and 
result oriented rather than about building new institutions. In that sense, flexible integration 
and “new” regionalism fit together quite well. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
What does this mean for European integration theory and for the larger field of European 
studies? First, we should broaden our focus when studying the European integration process, 
by not looking at the single EU integration scheme only, but rather at the multitude of 
integration schemes within Europe. Secondly, rather than constantly keeping explaining 
ongoing EU integration by focusing on its merits (in functional, constructivist of liberal-
intergovernmental terms), the demerits of EU integration (in terms of failing institutions, 
policies and governance) should be addressed more adequately. Finally, comparative research 
into alternative and differentiated integration schemes should be intensified. 
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